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Abstract
This Comment analyzes the expansive holding of Mohamed. Part I discusses the history
of both the state secrets privilege and the Totten bar. Part I also addresses the history of the
extraordinary rendition program as well as two recent US circuit court cases, Arar v. Ashcroft and
El-Masri v. United States, that involved both extraordinary rendition and the state secrets privilege.
Part II details the factual and procedural background of the Mohamed litigation, the arguments put
forth by both the plaintiffs and the intervening US government in their briefs, and the majority
and dissenting opinions. Part III argues that the Mohamed majority inappropriately expanded the
Reynolds state secrets privilege to render it essentially equivalent to the Totten bar.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 2010 the US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, dismissed the claims of five non-
US citizens who were victims of the US government's
extraordinary rendition program.' Plaintiffs sued Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc. ("Jeppesen"), a wholly owned, Boeing Company
subsidiary that, plaintiffs argued, knowingly facilitated the
plaintiffs' transportation to their torture destinations.2 The court
dismissed the case at the pleading stage on the grounds that the
state secrets privilege established in United States v. Reynolds3
mandated dismissal when continuing the litigation would create
an unreasonable risk that state secrets would be exposed.4
The Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc. decision was the
subject of much disdain.5 Most of the derision was focused on the
US government's continual ability to avoid publicly addressing its
role in committing torture abroad through its extraordinary
rendition program.6 The decision, however, is troublesome for
another reason. The holding expands the Reynolds state secrets
privilege far beyond its original intent.7 As such, it authorizes the
dismissal of a suit before the defendant even answers the
complaint.8 This expansion has essentially made the Reynolds
1. See Mohamed v.Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
2. See id. at 1075.
3. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (holding that evidence deemed
privileged may be removed and rendered unusable to protect military secrets).
4. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1087 (holding "that dismissal is nonetheless required
under Reynolds because there is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability
without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets" (emphasis omitted)).
5. See Editorial, Torture Is a Crime, Not a Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A30
(expressing disappointment with the Mohamed decision); see also Marc Ambinder, Fears
for Tears: Everybody Wants to Rule the World, ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2010, 7:30 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/fears-for-tears-everyone-wants-to-
rule-the-world/62683 (asserting that Mohamed decision ensures torture program will
remain secret).
6. See Torture Is a Crime, supra note 5 (noting that "secrecy privileges have been
used to avoid embarrassing the government, not to protect real secrets"); see also
Ambinder, supra note 5 (explaining that privilege provides government with a method
of avoiding prosecution for intolerable acts).
7. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (detailing the Ninth Circuit's
expansion of the Reynolds state secrets privilege).
8. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1076 (explaining that Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
("Jeppesen") had yet to file answer).
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privilege equivalent to the nonjusticiability rule of Totten v. United
States.9
US courts have interpreted the Totten bar to call for the
dismissal of any suit where the very subject matter of the action is
a state secret.'0 The Totten bar is thought to be the precursor to
the evidentiary, state secrets privilege articulated in Reynolds."
Unwilling to dismiss the suit under Totten, the majority in
Mohamed expanded the Reynolds privilege in an effort to dismiss
the lawsuit on the pleadings, the foreseeable result under
Totten.12
This Comment analyzes the expansive holding of Mohamed.
Part I discusses the history of both the state secrets privilege and
the Totten bar. Part I also addresses the history of the
extraordinary rendition program as well as two recent US circuit
court cases, Arar v. Ashcroft~' and El-Masri v. United States,'4 that
involved both extraordinary rendition and the state secrets
privilege. Part II details the factual and procedural background
of the Mohamed litigation, the arguments put forth by both the
plaintiffs and the intervening US government in their briefs, and
the majority and dissenting opinions. Part III argues that the
Mohamed majority inappropriately expanded the Reynolds state
secrets privilege to render it essentially equivalent to the Totten
bar.
9. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (holding that any suit revolving
around confidential government agreement should be dismissed at outset); see infra Part
L.A (discussing the Totten decision and its relationship to the state secrets privilege).
10. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1078 (explaining that "the Totten bar applies to cases
in which 'the very subject matter of the action' is 'a matter of state secret' "(quoting
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953))).
11. See Rita Glasionov, Note, In Furtherance of Transparency and Litigants' Rights:
Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 458, 462 (2009) (noting that
Totten v. United States is "considered to be the main precursor" to the state secrets
privilege); see also LOUIs FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION AND 9/11: RECURRING THREATS TO
AMERICA'S FREEDOMS 255 (2008) (observing that Totten is credited as establishing the
state secrets privilege).
12. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1085 ("We do not resolve the difficult question of
precisely which claims may be barred under Totten because application of the Reynolds
privilege leads us to conclude that this litigation cannot proceed further.").
13. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
14. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S.
947 (2007).
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I. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION
In Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit applied the state secrets
privilege to a lawsuit involving the US government's
extraordinary rendition program. This Part provides background
information on both the state secrets privilege and the
extraordinary rendition program. Section A provides a history of
the state secrets privilege and examines its recent evolution.
Section B discusses the history of the US extraordinary rendition
program. Finally, Section C examines how US circuit courts of
appeals have adjudicated claims concerning extraordinary
rendition.
A. State Secrets Privilege
The majority in Mohamed dismissed the case pursuant to the
Reynolds state secrets privilege.15 This common law, evidentiary
privilege allows the US government to request that evidence be
removed because the material contains military secrets.16 The US
Supreme Court established this privilege in Reynolds.'7 In that
case, three civilian observers were killed in the crash of a US Air
Force B-29 bomber in Waycross, Georgia.'8 The aircraft was
testing secret electronic equipment when one of its engines
caught fire.' 9 The widows of the three deceased observers
brought suits against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.2o
During discovery, the widows asked the US Air Force to
produce the official accident report and the statements of the
three surviving crew members taken during the crash
investigation.2' The US government moved to quash the motion
for production on the grounds that US Air Force regulations
categorized such materials as privileged.22 The district court
15. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1073 (holding that the case should be dismissed
because plaintiffs cannot overcome state secrets privilege articulated in Reynolds).
16. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (articulating that the US
government may invoke a privilege to remove evidence containing state secrets).
17. See id.
18. Id. at 2-3.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 2-3; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
21. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
22. Id. at 3-4.
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judge denied the government's motion.23 The court granted a
rehearing on this issue, at which time the Secretary of the US Air
Force filed a formal "Claim of Privilege," in which the
government asserted that it could not produce the requested
documents because the aircraft, at the time of the fire, was
engaged in a highly secret mission.24 The district court ordered
the government to produce the requested documents so it could
determine whether they contained privileged information.25
When the government refused, the court ordered the facts to be
recognized as establishing a claim of negligence in the plaintiffs
favor and entered final judgment for them.26 The Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision.27
The US Supreme Court reversed, and held that the
government asserted a valid claim of privilege.28 The Court
acknowledged the existence of a privilege against producing
evidence that would reveal military secrets.2 9 It explained that the
privilege could only be asserted by the US government through a
formal claim of privilege invoked by "the head of the department
which has control over the matter."30 The Court further noted
that the district court alone was charged with the responsibility to
evaluate the claim of privilege, "yet do so without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect."3 1
The Court explained that, to determine whether a claim of
privilege was valid, the judges were to also consider the plaintiffs
need for the requested evidence.32 Nevertheless, even the
strongest showing of necessity would not prevail over a valid
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id. at5.
26. See id. (explaining that according to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (i), facts can be
established for a party if the opposing party fails to comply with an order related to
those facts).
27. See id.; Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951) (upholding
the district court's decision for the same reasons).
28. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
29. See id. at 7 ("The existence of the privilege is conceded by the court below, and,
indeed, by the most outspoken critics of governmental claims of privilege.").
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. Id. at 8.
32. See id. at 11 ("In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will
determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invoking the privilege is appropriate.").
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claim of privilege to protect military secrets.33 Furthermore, the
Court pointed out that a valid assertion of the state secrets
privilege does not automatically trigger dismissal of a case.34
Rather, plaintiffs would simply be prevented from using the
privileged evidence to prove their claim.35
Commentators believe that the state secrets privilege, as
articulated in Reynolds, is rooted in the Totten bar.36 Established in
Totten v. United States,37 the Totten bar differs from that articulated
in Reynolds. The Totten bar is not merely an evidentiary privilege;
rather it is a bar to justiciability.38 In Totten, the intestate of
William Lloyd brought suit to recover wages owed Lloyd under a
contract with President Abraham Lincoln.39 During the Civil War,
President Lincoln hired Lloyd to spy on the Confederate Army
for the Union.4 For these services Lloyd was to receive US$200 a
month, but instead he was only reimbursed his expenses.41
The US Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims'
dismissal of suit,4 2 explaining that Lloyd's contract with the
government was for clandestine services.43 As such, it was
understood that neither the employer nor the employee would
ever discuss this relationship.44 A lawsuit to enforce the secret
33. See id. ("[E]ven the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.").
34. See id. (noting there was plenty of nonprivileged, available evidence of which
plaintiffs could avail themselves).
35. See id.; see also Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope
through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 101 (2007) (" [T]he privilege
was designed simply to prevent some information from reaching discovery while
allowing the case to proceed.").
36. See Glasionov, supra note 11, at 462 (explaining that the state secrets privilege
can trace its roots to Totten); see also FISHER, supra note 11, at 255 (remarking that Totten
is recognized as originating the state secrets privilege).
37. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
38. See id. at 107 (prohibiting "the maintenance of any suit" that falls within the
scope of Totten).
39. Id. at 105.
40. See id. at 105-06 (explaining that Lloyd "was to proceed South and ascertain
the number of troops stationed at different points in the insurrectionary States, procure
plans of forts and fortifications, and gain such other information as might be beneficial
to the government of the United States").
41. Id. at 106.
42. Id. at 107. The suit was dismissed by the Court of Claims because the court was
unsure if the president could in fact bind the government to such a contract. Lloyd's
intestate appealed the dismissal. Id. at 106.
43. Id. at 106.
44. Id.
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contract could not be maintained, as such a proceeding would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of the very matters intended to
be confidential. 45 The Court asserted that any lawsuit predicated
on the enforcement of a confidential agreement must be
dismissed at the outset.46
Commentators have asserted that, in recent years, the Totten
bar has often been conflated with the state secrets privilege
established in Reynolds.47 As a result, judges cite the Reynolds state
secrets privilege to completely dismiss cases, instead of simply
excluding privileged evidence.48 More than likely, such actions
are due to a footnote in Reynolds that cites Totten, explaining that
where the subject matter of an action is a state secret, the case
should be dismissed on the pleadings.49 As such, US courts have
interpreted the state secrets privilege to stand for the proposition
that if the "very subject matter" of a suit is deemed a state secret,
the case must be dismissed.50
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States ("9/11"), the US government often asserted this
misinterpretation of the Reynolds state secrets privilege in an
45. See id. at 106-07.
46. See id. at 107 ("It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids
the maintenance of any suit in a court ofjustice, the trial of which would inevitably lead
to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting
which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.").
47. See Glasionov, supra note 11, at 469 (explaining that changes to application of
Reynolds privilege has been attributed to "judicial conflation" of Reynolds and Totten); see
also Jeffrey L. Vagle, Note, A Kind of Hydraulic Pressure: Extraordinary Rendition, State
Secrets, and the Limits of Executive Power, 22 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 523, 540 (2008)
(suggesting that courts are conflating Reynolds and Totten).
48. See, e.g., Steven D. Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30
PACE L. REv. 778, 790 (2010) (noting a trend among courts to treat state secrets
privilege as a "rule of justiciability"); Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding, SLATE (May 22,
2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2142155 (articulating that courts are deferring to
expanded assertion of state secrets privilege, thereby dismissing entire lawsuits).
49. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) (arguing that it was
appropriate to dismiss the claim in Totten because the subject matter of the suit, the
contract to perform espionage, was itself a state secret and would never prevail over the
privilege); see also Glasionov, supra note 11, at 470 (noting that commentators reference
the footnote in Reynolds as support when noting that courts mistakenly cite Reynolds
when dismissing cases).
50. See Schwinn, supra note 48, at 801-02 (explaining that when Reynolds and Totten
are misconstrued, courts dismiss cases in which very subject matter of action is state
secret); see also Lyons, supra note 35, at 109-10 (asserting that courts dismiss cases when
"the very question upon which the case turns" is a state secret, or when "secrets are so
central to the subject matter").
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effort to dismiss suits involving national security issues, such as
the potential mistreatment of non-US citizen, terrorist suspects.51
The problem with this interpretation, according to
commentators, is that Reynolds does not stand for this
proposition.52 Reynolds is an evidentiary privilege and, therefore,
should be used only to limit the production of certain pieces of
evidence.53 These scholars maintain that the Reynolds Court never
intended for the state secrets privilege to completely dismiss a
case, at least not at the outset of the litigation before any
evidence is even requested.54 As such, courts and the government
have been invoking the Reynolds state secrets privilege to support
procedures that seem to be more rooted in Totten.55
Moreover, there is some doubt regarding whether Totten
even supports the "very subject matter" bar to litigation, given
the US Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Tenet v. Doe.55 in
Tenet, the Court clarified the distinction between Reynolds and
Totten.57 The Totten bar, according to the Court, prevents judicial
review of any lawsuit where a plaintiff's case is premised upon the
51. See Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal Tactic by
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at A32 ("While the privilege, defined by a 1953 Supreme
Court ruling, was once used to shield sensitive documents or witnesses from disclosure,
it is now often used to try to snuff out lawsuits at their inception . . . ."); see also Lanman,
supra note 48 ("[T]he administration has been routinely asserting the privilege to
dismiss the suits in their entirety.").
52. See Lyons, supra note 35, at 110 (asserting that this understanding of the state
secrets privilege is inconsistent with Reynolds); see also Schwinn, supra note 48, at 825
(opining that Reynolds does not support the very subject matter test).
53. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; see also Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and
Separation ofPowers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1937 (2007) (articulating that in Reynolds,
the Court limited the state secrets privilege to evidence removal); Glasionov, supra note
11, at 471 (noting that Reynolds is meant to limit discovery).
54. See Lyons, supra note 35, at 118 (explaining that Reynolds was careful not to take
any extreme measures, only wanting to exclude evidence, not dismiss a case at outset);
see also Schwinn, supra note 48, at 825-26 (concluding that Reynolds was only focused on
evidence, so that dismissal could only result following a review of privileged and
nonprivileged evidence).
55. See Glasionov, supra note 11, at 470 (articulating that if a case is to be dismissed
at the outset based on the subject matter of suit, the rationale for dismissal should be
based on Totten); see also Lyons, supra note 35, at 120 (arguing that expansion of the
state secrets privilege "is treading into the realm of Totten").
56. See Schwinn, supra note 48, at 826 (noting that Totten only applies to "secret spy
contracts"); see also Frost, supra note 53, at 1941 (agreeing that the "Totten bar precludes
judicial review of any claim based on a covert agreement to engage in espionage for the
United States").
57. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2005) (explaining the difference between
Totten and Reynolds doctrines).
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existence of a secret espionage affiliation with the United
States.5 8 Any action that is based on an alleged espionage
agreement is not justiciable under any circumstance.59 On the
other hand, the Court explained that Reynolds is a much
narrower holding. It merely articulates an evidentiary privilege,
not a "categorical bar" to claims.60 The Court further clarified
this by specifically stating that Reynolds does not replace Totten.61
B. Extraordinary Rendition
Mohamed involved the application of the state secrets
privilege to the US government's extraordinary rendition
program.62 The extraordinary rendition program involves the
transfer, by US intelligence officials, of non-US citizens suspected
of terrorism to a state that will detain and interrogate them
outside the bounds of international law.63 Upon capture by
intelligence operatives, suspected terrorists are hooded,
handcuffed, and flown on a Gulfstream jet to other countries
whose own officials subject the captured individuals to harsh
interrogations.64
The Clinton Administration initially established the
extraordinary rendition program.65 The program, as it was
58. See id. at 8 ("No matter the clothing in which alleged spies dress their claims,
Totten precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents' where success depends
upon the existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government.").
59. See id. at 9 (" [Llawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are
altogether forbidden.").
60. See id. at 8-9 (explaining that the state secrets privilege in Reynolds was an
evidentiary privilege, which is different from a rule ofjusticiability).
61. See id. at 9-10 ("Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be read to have replaced
the categorical Totten bar . . . .").
62. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
63. See Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping
Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 629, 629 n.1 (2008)
(explaining the extraordinary rendition program); see also Jane Mayer, Outsourcing
Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (defining the extraordinary rendition program).
64. See Mayer, supra note 63, at 107 (explaining mechanics of the extraordinary
rendition program); see also Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1421 (2007) (discussing published reports of the extraordinary
rendition program).
65. See FISHER, supra note 11, at 330 (describing formation of the extraordinary
rendition program); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate
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conceived, was not focused on interrogation.66 Rather, it sought
to capture a suspect that was wanted in another country for trial
or detention and send the suspect to that country to face
prosecution or serve the existing sentence.67 After 9/11, however,
the nature of the extraordinary rendition program was expanded
to include capture and transfer for interrogation.68 This
expansion progressed despite the United States being a signatory
to the Convention against Torture, a treaty that bars the transfer
of an individual to another state for the purpose of torture.69
In 2006, President George W. Bush acknowledged the
existence of the extraordinary rendition program. 70 He admitted
that the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") was running a
program that took certain terrorist suspects outside the United
States for detention and questioning.71 In January 2009,
President Barack Obama established a task force to review the
practices of the extraordinary rendition program.72
Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 472 (2009)
(articulating the origins of the extraordinary rendition program).
66. See FISHER, supra note 11, at 330-31 (explaining the purpose of the
extraordinary rendition program); see also Dhooge, supra note 65, at 472 (describing the
goal of the extraordinary rendition program as initially conceived).
67. See Dhooge, supra note 65, at 472 (explaining process of the original
extraordinary rendition program); see also Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits
of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1249, 1254-55 (2007) (describing
how the extraordinary rendition program under President Bill Clinton worked).
68. See Chesney, supra note 67, at 1255 ("Since 9/11, the rendition program has
grown beyond these initial parameters . . . ."); see also Dhooge, supra note 65, at 473
("The rendition program was significantly modified after September 11.").
69. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 112 Stat. 2681, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("No
State Party shall expel, return .. . or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.").
70. See Fisher, supra note 64, at 1433 ("On September 6, 2006, in a lengthy
statement, President Bush provided details of the CIA rendition program."); see also
Dhooge, supra note 65, at 474 ("The existence of the program was disclosed by
President Bush on September 6, 2006.").
71. See Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569, 1570
(Sept. 6, 2006) ("In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of
suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and
questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency.").
72. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199, 202 (2010) (specifying that the task
force is "to study and evaluate the practices of transferring individuals to other nations
in order to ensure that such practices comply with the domestic laws, international
obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in the transfer of
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C. Other Extraordinary Rendition Cases
In addition to Mohamed, US circuit courts of appeals have
heard two other cases involving victims of the extraordinary
rendition program. In Arar v. Ashcroft, the US Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit dismissed the case on the merits,73 while
in El-Masri v. United States, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case
on the grounds that the state secrets privilege barred the
litigation.74
1. Arar v. Ashcroft
Maher Arar is a Canadian citizen who in 2002 flew back to
Canada from a vacation in Tunisia.75 Arar's complaint alleged
that upon making a stop at New York's John F. Kennedy
International Airport he was detained and questioned by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his alleged terrorist
affiliations.76 Arar was subsequently detained in a Manhattan
correctional facility for about ten days.77 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") questioned Arar several times
during his detention.78 On October 8, 2002, INS ordered Arar to
be removed to Syria, his birthplace.79 While in Syrian custody,
Arar was subjected to harsh interrogation techniques and forced
to live in a tiny cell.80 On October 5, 2003, after almost a year in
Syrian custody, Arar was released to Canadian officials and
returned home to Canada.81
individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or with the
effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or obligations of the United
States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in its custody or control").
73. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that Arar
failed to state a claim under the Torture Victim Prevention Act and that the Bivens
doctrine did not apply to extraordinary rendition).
74. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S.
947 (2007) (affirming district court's dismissal of case on grounds that "state secrets are
so central to this matter that any attempt at further litigation would threaten their
disclosure").
75. Arar, 585 F.3d at 565.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 565-66.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 566.
81. Id. at 566-67.
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Arar filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, seeking damages from US officials
for harms suffered as a result of his detentions in both New York
and Syria.82 The court dismissed the claim and a three-judge
panel of the Second Circuit affirmed.83 The court, sitting en
banc, similarly dismissed the case on the merits. 8 4 The majority
explained that a Bivens action had never been entertained in the
context of the extraordinary rendition program.85 The Bivens
remedy is a private action brought against federal officers for
violations of an individual's constitutional rights.86 The US
Supreme Court has only applied Bivens in two contexts: a Due
Process Clause violation in employment discrimination and an
Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials.87 The Second
Circuit declined to apply Bivens to claims involving the
extraordinary rendition program to avoid issuance of a ruling
that would resonate in the national security and foreign policy
arenas.88
Judge Robert Sack authored a dissenting opinion, joined by
three other judges, asserting that the court should have instead
resolved the case in light of the state secrets privilege.89 Doing so,
he posited, would allow the court to avoid issuing a holding with
broad ramifications and instead resolve the case on its particular
facts.90 Furthermore, a state secrets privilege analysis would
address the issues that caused the majority to decline the
extension of a Bivens remedy to extraordinary rendition.9'
82. Id. at 567.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 572 ("[N]o court has previously afforded a Bivens remedy for
extraordinary rendition.").
86. See id. at 571; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing the Bivens action).
87. Arar, 585 F.3d at 571.
88. See id. at 574 ("Here, we need not decide categorically whether a Bivens action
can lie against policymakers because in the context of extraordinary rendition, such an
action would have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the
security of the nation, and that fact counsels hesitation.").
89. See id. at 583 (Sack,J., dissenting) ("Such a holding is unnecessary inasmuch as
the government assures us that this case could likely be resolved quickly and
expeditiously in the district court by application of the state-secrets privilege.").
90. Id. at 605.
91. See id. at 606 (outlining the majority's reasons for not applying Bivens and
noting that the state secrets privilege "was designed to address" these factors).
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2. El-Masri v. United States
In advocating for the application of the state secrets
privilege in Arar, Judge Sack noted that the Fourth Circuit
applied the state secrets privilege to a claim involving
extraordinary rendition in EI-Masri.92 In EI-Masri, Macedonian
law enforcement officials detained plaintiff Khaled El-Masri, a
German citizen of Lebanese descent, in Macedonia, in December
2003.93 In January 2004, CIA operatives took El-Masri to a
detention facility in Kabul, Afghanistan where he remained until
May 28, 2004, when he was transported to Albania and ultimately
returned to his home in Germany.94 El-Masri claimed that his
detention in Afghanistan was part of the US extraordinary
rendition program9 - and that he was subjected to harsh
interrogation techniques and substandard living conditions while
in detention in Afghanistan. 96
In December 2005, El-Masri filed suit against former CIA
Director George Tenet and several corporations accused of
partaking in his transfer to Afghanistan.97 The United States
intervened and moved to dismiss the lawsuit on grounds that the
state secrets privilege prohibited the litigation. 98 Despite El-
Masri's assertion that he could provide ample public information
to corroborate his claims,99 the district court dismissed the suit.100
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
due to the US government's successful assertion of the state
secrets privilege.0 1 The court explained that both Reynolds and
Totten support the proposition that dismissal is warranted when
the "very subject matter" of a suit is itself a state secret.10 2 The
92. See id. at 606-07 (citing El-Masri to support claim that the state secrets privilege
is appropriate for claims involving extraordinary rendition).
93. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
947 (2007).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (detailing that El-Masri was allegedly beaten, drugged, and confined to a
small, unsanitary cell).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 301.
99. Id. at 301-02.
100. Id. at 302.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 306 (relying on Totten and Reynolds by stating, "The Supreme Court
has recognized that some matters are so pervaded by state secrets as to be incapable of
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very subject matter of a lawsuit, under a state secrets analysis, is
comprised of the "central facts" that are essential to a plaintiffs
claim.103 The essential facts in El-Masri's case would have to
demonstrate that all defendants were aware of and participated
in his detention and interrogation. 1 04 Evidence to illustrate such
facts would undoubtedly be privileged as state secrets. 05
Therefore, the very subject matter of the lawsuit was a state secret
requiring the claim to be dismissed. 06
This Part laid out the history of both the state secrets
privilege and the extraordinary rendition program. This Part
further addressed recent US court dispositions of cases in this
area. With this contextual background in mind, Part II examines
the Mohamed case, including the circumstances leading to the
litigation, the arguments asserted by all parties, and the Ninth
Circuit's ruling.
II. MOHAMED v.JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC.
Similar to El-Masri, Mohamed was dismissed on state secrets
grounds.107 Unlike El-Masri, however, the Ninth Court, sitting en
banc, invoked only the state secrets privilege as articulated in
Reynolds and found the Totten bar inapplicable. 0 8 The court
understood the Reynolds state secrets privilege to require the
dismissal of a case when further litigation would present an
unjustifiable risk of disclosing state secrets.109 This Part examines
the Mohamed en banc decision in greater depth. Section A
discusses the factual and procedural history of the litigation.
judicial resolution once the privilege has been invoked."). The Court also asserted that
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), stands for this proposition as well. Id.
103. Id. at 308 ("[F]or purpose of the state secrets analysis, the 'central facts' and
,very subject matter' of an action are those facts that are essential to prosecuting that
action or defending against it.").
104. See id. at 309 (explaining that the central facts to this litigation "would be the
roles, if any, that the defendants played in the events he alleges").
105. See id. (suggesting that evidence of this kind "would implicate privileged state
secrets" and may even be barred under Totten as it would involve "CIA espionage
contracts").
106. See id.
107. Mohamed v.Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (holding that claim should be dismissed because plaintiffs cannot overcome state
secrets privilege).
108. See id. at 1085 (choosing not to rule on the basis of the Totten bar).
109. See id. at 1089 ("[F]urther litigation presents an unacceptable risk of
disclosure of state secrets").
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Section B outlines the arguments put forth by both the plaintiffs
and the intervening US government in their briefs. Section C
details the majority decision and Section D discusses the
dissenting opinion.
A. Factual and Procedural History
The plaintiffs in this case are five non-US citizens who
claimed to be subjects of the CIA's extraordinary rendition
program.110 Each plaintiff underwent a slightly different
extraordinary rendition experience, yet each one contended that
Jeppesen provided various support services to the flights that
transported them to their destinations of detention and
torture."' According to the plaintiffs, Jeppesen provided these
services even though the company knew, or should have known,
that the flights were part of the extraordinary rendition
program.112
Plaintiff Binyam Mohamed is an Ethiopian citizen who was
living in Pakistan but was a legal resident of the United Kingdom.
Pakistani officials arrested him in 2002 on immigration
charges.113 While detained in Pakistan, CIA agents interrogated
Mohamed for several months before transferring him to
Morocco." 4 Mohamed further alleged that after eighteen months
of torture and harsh interrogations in Morocco, the CIA once
110. Id. at 1073.
111. Id. at 1075 (describing plaintiffs' allegations that "defendant Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation, provided flight planning and logistical support
services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights transporting each of the five
plaintiffs among the various locations where they were detained and allegedly subjected
to torture"); see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (noting thatJeppesen is "a wholly owned subsidiary of Boeing Company").
112. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1075 ("Jeppesen provided this assistance with actual or
constructive 'knowledge of the objective of the rendition program,' including
knowledge that the plaintiffs 'would be subjected to forced disappearance, detention,
and torture' by U.S. and foreign government officials."). Plaintiffs cited statements of a
former Jeppesen employee made to the press, explaining that the company knew it was
facilitating flights for the extraordinary rendition program. See Jane Mayer, The CIA'
Travel Agent, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 34 (citing a formerJeppesen employee, who
stated that a Jeppesen executive remarked at a meeting, "We do all the extraordinary
rendition flights .... ).
113. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1074.
114. Id.
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again transferred him, this time to Afghanistan.115 After several
months of detention and torture, Mohamed was sent to the US
military prison at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba.'16 Mohamed remained
at GuantAnamo for five years before earning a release and
returning to the United Kingdom.117
Plaintiff Abou Elkassim Britel is an Italian citizen who was
also arrested in Pakistan on immigration charges.118 Britel was
subsequently turned over to CIA officials who, similarly to
Mohamed, transferred Britel to Morocco.119 While detained in
Morocco, according to Britel, he was repeatedly tortured. 120
Although he was eventually released, Britel was re-arrested
shortly thereafter, forced to sign a confession, and sentenced to
prison in Morocco for terrorist-related activities. 21
Plaintiff Ahmed Agiza is an Egyptian national who, at the
time of his rendition, was living in Sweden.122 Agiza was
apprehended by Swedish officials, transferred to CIA custody,
and flown to Egypt, where he was detained, tortured, and
interrogated.12 3 Agiza eventually received a trial in Egypt, where
he was convicted and sentenced to prison.124 The Swedish
government has publicly acknowledged the circumstances of
Agiza's rendition.125
115. Id. (detailing that Moroccan authorities allegedly beat Mohamed, broke his
bones, "cut him with a scalpel all over his body," "poured 'hot stinging liquid' into the
open wounds," and forced Mohamed "to listen to extremely loud music day and
night").
116. Id. (explaining that while in Afghanistan, Mohamed was allegedly forced to
listen to "the recorded screams of women and children, 24 hours a day," and "was fed
sparingly and irregularly").
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (noting that Moroccan officials allegedly beat Britel, deprived him of sleep
and food, and threatened Britel with sexual torture).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (stating that in Egypt, Agiza was allegedly beaten, forced to live in a small,
cold cell, and subjected to electric shock treatments).
124. Id.
125. Id. ("According to plaintiffs, '[v]irtually every aspect of Agiza's rendition,
including his torture in Egypt, has been publicly acknowledged by the Swedish
government.'"); see Craig Whitlock, New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action, WASH.
POST, May 21, 2005, at Al (reporting on Swedish government report that details the
specifics ofAgiza's rendition).
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Plaintiff Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah is a Yemini
citizen who was taken into custody by Jordanian officials while
visiting his mother in Jordan.126 Bashmilah alleged that he was
transferred to CIA custody and flown to several locations where
he was repeatedly tortured.127 Eventually, the CIA returned
Bashmilah to Yemen, where he was tried in a Yemeni court,
convicted of an inconsequential crime, and released.128
Lastly, plaintiff Bishar Al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen and legal
resident of the United Kingdom, was arrested in Gambia while
traveling there on business.129 According to Al-Rawi, he was also
sent to Afghanistan were he was repeatedly tortured.130 Similarly
to Mohamed, Al-Rawi was later transferred to the Guantinamo
Bay prison.13' Eventually, Al-Rawi was released from Guantinamo
and returned to the United Kingdom.132
All five plaintiffs brought suit against Jeppesen under the
Alien Tort Statute for the company's contribution to their
detentions and tortures.133 Before Jeppesen filed an answer to the
complaint, the United States moved to intervene and to dismiss
the suit under the state secrets privilege.134 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California granted
both motions.135 The court dismissed the case because the very
subject matter of the action was a state secret, making the case
nonjusticiable.136 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the case was not barred under Totten 37
126. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1075.
127. Id. (articulating that Bashmillah was allegedly subjected to sleep deprivation,
painful shackling, and light and loud noise for twenty-four hours).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1074.
130. Id. at 1074-75 (noting that Al-Rawi was allegedly beaten, deprived of sleep,
and forced to listen to loud noises twenty-four hours a day).
131. Id. at 1075.
132. Id.
133. Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
134. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1076.
135. Id.
136. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (finding "that the issues involved in this case are non-justiciable because the very
subject matter of the case is a state secret").
137. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g
en banc granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that Totten did not bar the
claims asserted by plaintiffs).
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and that the Reynolds state secrets privilege could only be asserted
to remove certain pieces of evidence.' 38 The Ninth Circuit
granted the US government's motion to rehear the case en
banc.'39
B. Arguments from the Briefs
1. Plaintiffs' Briefs
Plaintiffs asserted in their moving and reply briefs that the
Totten bar and the Reynolds state secrets privilege were two
different constructs and the lawsuit could not be dismissed under
either doctrine. 140 They argued that the state secrets privilege, as
defined in Reynolds, is an evidentiary privilege that the
government can invoke to remove certain pieces of evidence that
may expose military secrets.'4 1 Therefore, under Reynolds, a
lawsuit can only be dismissed if, after removing the privileged
evidence, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case, or a
defendant cannot appropriately defend against a claim.142 It is
impossible to know at the pleading stage of litigation what
evidence, privileged or nonprivileged, a plaintiff will introduce.143
138. Id. at 957 ("Reynolds applies to evidence, not information.").
139. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1077.
140. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc at 8, Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693) ("ITihe
government continues to conflate the justiciability doctrine articulated in Totten with the
evidentiary privilege recognized in Reynolds-even though the Supreme Court could not
be any clearer that they are distinct doctrines that serve distinct purposes.").
141. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 29, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693) ("The state secrets privilege is a
'common-law evidentiary privilege that permits the government to bar the disclosure of
information if there is a "reasonable danger" that disclosure will "expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.""' (quoting
Al-Haramain Islamic Found. Inc., v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2007))); see also
id. at 31 ("[T]he privilege must be invoked with respect to discrete and specific
evidence-not asserted as a sweeping justification for dismissing a suit on its
pleadings.").
142. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc, supra note 141,
at 10 (articulating that "it may be dismissed only if successful invocation of the privilege
deprives plaintiffs of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case, or defendant of
evidence indispensable to a valid defense").
143. See id. at 13-14 (" [I]t simply cannot be determined 'whether the parties will
be able to establish their cases without use of privileged evidence without also knowing
what non-privileged evidence they will marshal.'" (quoting Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 961 (9th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis in original)).
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Thus, the lawsuit could not be dismissed under the Reynolds state
secrets privilege at the pleading stage.144 The case should
continue and the government should be allowed to invoke the
state secrets privilege at the discovery stage.145
Additionally, the case could not be dismissed under a strict
reading of Totten, which bars lawsuits pertaining only to the
enforceability of an espionage contract. 46 Plaintiffs argued that
not every one of their claims requires proof of a contract between
Jeppesen and the US government that was supposed to remain
secret.147 For example, plaintiffs noted that in trying to prove that
Jeppesen acted recklessly with regard to whether the plaintiffs
would be tortured, they would only have to show that the
company had actual or constructive knowledge that the plaintiffs
might be tortured.148
Likewise, they argued, the case could not be dismissed
under the broader, "very subject matter" interpretation of
Totten.149 The very subject matter of this case was not a state
secret.o50 The plaintiffs cited to another Ninth Circuit case where
the court established that the very subject matter of a case cannot
be considered a state secret when the government has disclosed
the existence of the subject matter of the suit.1'5 Therefore, the
144. See id. at 12 (noting that the case should not be dismissed because the
required determination "could not be made at this stage").
145. See id. at 14-15 (arguing that the case should continue and contending that
"[t]here will be no shortage of opportunities for the government to protect its
legitimate interests with respect to specific privileged evidence").
146. See id. at 9 (defining Totten as a "narrow doctrine pertaining to enforceability
of espionage contracts").
147. See id. at 10 (quoting the original Ninth Circuit opinion, which asserted that
"not all of plaintiffs' theories of liability require proof of a relationship between
Jeppesen and the government" (quoting Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 953)).
148. See id. at 11 ("For example, plaintiffs' claim 'thatJeppesen acted with reckless
disregard for whether the passengers it helped transport would be tortured' at their
destinations requires no evidence that Jeppesen 'entered into a secret agreement with
the government,' but only that Jeppesen acted despite 'actual or imputed knowledge'
that plaintiffs might face torture." (quoting Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 953-54)).
149. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 142, at 34-35 (noting that a very
subject matter dismissal is "inapplicable").
150. See id. at 35 (showing that the heading of section A of the plaintiffs' brief
states, "Under this Court's Jurisprudence, the 'Very Subject Matter' of this Suit Is Not a
State Secret").
151. See id. at 39 (citing Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190
(9th Cir. 2007) as establishing principle that "when the government has publicly
confirmed the existence of an intelligence program-and publicly defended its
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extensive comments of the CIA and Bush Administration officials
about the extraordinary rendition program establish that the
subject matter of the suit was not a state secret.152 Moreover,
statements of non-US government officials regarding their
countries' participation in extraordinary rendition further
establish that the very subject matter of the case, the
extraordinary rendition program, is not a state secret. 53
2. The US Government's Brief
The US government contended that the case should be
dismissed under both Totten and Reynolds. Regarding the Totten
bar, the government asserted that the case involved a
confidential government agreement similar to the contract in
Totten.154 As such, confidential secrets would inevitably be
disclosed, contrary to the public interest. 55 Therefore, the case
should be dismissed and deemed nonjusticiable.156
According to the US government, the case could also be
dismissed under the state secrets privilege because military
secrets were central to the litigation.'57 Therefore, continuing to
litigate the case would risk disclosure of sensitive matters,
contrary to the purpose of the state secrets privilege as
articulated in Reynolds.158 To support this assertion, the
legality-it cannot thereafter secure dismissal of a suit challenging that program on the
ground that its very subject matter is a state secret").
152. See id. at 40-47 (citing various public disclosures from government officials on
the extraordinary rendition program); see also Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 141, at 19-22 (citing additional US government
disclosures including those from Obama Administration officials).
153. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc, supra note 141,
at 22-28 (noting various disclosures by assorted governments and intergovernmental
organizations, including several pertaining specifically to plaintiffs in this litigation).
154. See Redacted, Unclassified Brief for United States on Rehearing En Banc at
25-26, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
15693) (comparing agreements in Totten with the alleged contracts between Jeppesen
and the CIA, and noting that they are similar).
155. See id. at 25-26 (explaining that agreement is confidential and as such is
protected).
156. See id. at 31 ("[A] complaint alleging on its face that the plaintiff entered into
a secret espionage relationship with the Government is properly dismissed at the outset
as nonjusticiable.").
157. See id. at 19 ("State secrets are so central to this case that, as the district court
correctly concluded, no further litigation can proceed. . . .").
158. See id. at 18-19 (explaining that when there is a risk of disclosing secrets, a
case can be dismissed); see also id. at 29 (citing to portion of Reynolds that explains that a
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government cited to the other extraordinary rendition case
previously dismissed on state secrets grounds, El-Masri.15 9 The
government contended that the court should hold, just as the
Fourth Circuit did in El-Masri, that state secrets are so central to
this case that any evidence necessary to prove the alleged facts
would undoubtedly be privileged. 60 As such, the case should be
dismissed.
Finally, the government asserted that the Reynolds state
secrets privilege is not designed merely to protect evidence. 161 It
argued that in Reynolds, the Court did not specifically state that
the state secrets privilege could not be considered prior to
discovery. 162 That Court did not have the opportunity to consider
that point because in Reynolds, the government did not invoke
the privilege until the discovery stage. 163 The absence of a specific
articulation with regard to invoking the state secrets privilege
during the pleading stage should not be deemed a rejection of
such an assertion. Furthermore, the purpose of the state secrets
privilege is to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information with
national security implications.16 4 Requiring the government to
invoke the state secrets privilege only with regard to certain
pieces of evidence allowed such sensitive information to be
disclosed in pre-discovery documents.165 This was contrary to the
court must be careful in its inquiry to not disclose the very matters which the privilege is
designed to protect).
159. See id. at 22-23 ("The claims in this case are strikingly similar to those in El-
Masri v. United States . .. ").
160. See id. (comparing case to EI-Masri and noting that dismissal is appropriate for
the exact same reasons).
161. See id. at 29 (" [T]he characterization of the state secrets doctrine as a narrow
'evidentiary privilege' is incorrect.").
162. See id. at 30 ("[N]othing in the Supreme Court's decision supports the panel's
refusal to consider the privilege prior to discovery.").
163. See id. ("In Reynolds, the state secrets privilege was not raised until the
discovery phase of a proceeding, where it was claimed with respect to an accident
investigation report prepared by the Air Force and related statements by crew members.
The Reynolds Court thus had no occasion to consider whether the state secrets privilege
can be invoked at an earlier stage of proceedings .. . .").
164. See id. at 40 (defining the privilege's "basic purpose" as "protection against
public disclosure of information that would damage national security").
165. See id. at 22 ("[T]here is no reasonable doubt that any further proceeding in
this case, including any attempt by Jeppesen to present defenses or an answer, or to
conduct discovery, would seriously risk disclosure of privileged material and threaten
substantial harm to the United States." (emphasis omitted)).
2011] MOHAMED & THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 1421
very purpose of the state secrets privilege.166 Therefore, because
national security would be jeopardized regardless of whether the
secrets are disclosed via evidence or information, it is incorrect to
characterize the state secrets privilege as merely evidentiary.' 67
C. The Majority Opinion
In a six to five decision, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
plaintiffs' suit.16 8 It did so only on the basis of the Reynolds state
secrets privilege.169 The majority concluded there was no possible
way to litigate the case without "creating an unjustifiable risk of
divulging state secrets." 70
The majority began by defining both the Totten bar and the
Reynolds state secrets privilege, as they understood them, and
explaining the difference between the two.17 1 The court
explained that the Totten bar prevents the litigation of a case
where the very subject matter of the action is a state secret. 72 On
the other hand, the Reynolds state secrets privilege is an
evidentiary privilege that, when successfully invoked, will remove
certain pieces of evidence from the litigation.173
The majority noted the procedural requirements for a
successful invocation, as articulated in Reynolds.174 Furthermore,
the state secrets privilege may be asserted at either the pleading
or the discovery stage.'75 If a privilege claim is successfully
166. See id. at 42 ("[T]he panel's approach to state secrets privilege would greatly
undermine the effectiveness of the privilege.").
167. See id. at 40 ("The national security is harmed when state secrets information
is disclosed, regardless of whether the disclosure comes in the form of a particular item
of 'evidence."').
168. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) ("After much deliberation, we reluctantly conclude this is such a case, and the
plaintiffs' action must be dismissed.").
169. See id. at 1085 (explaining that dismissal is based on Reynolds).
170. Id. at 1087.
171. See id. at 1077 (explaining that the court will define the two different state
secrets doctrines).
172. See id. at 1078 ("[T]he Totten bar applies to cases in which 'the very subject
matter of the action' is 'a matter of state secret.'" (quoting United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953))).
173. See id. at 1079 ("A successful assertion of privilege under Reynolds will remove
the privileged evidence from the litigation.").
174. See id. at 1080 (discussing procedures for invoking the privilege explained in
Reynolds).
175. See id. ("The privilege may be asserted at any time, even at the pleading
stage.").
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invoked and subsequently granted, the case may then be
dismissed in any one of three scenarios: the plaintiff cannot make
out a prima facie claim with nonprivileged evidence; the
defendant is deprived of information that is necessary to mount a
valid defense; or litigating the claim even with nonprivileged
evidence results in an unreasonable risk of disclosing state
secrets.' 76 The majority believed that the third scenario was
applicable to Mohamed.'77
Before articulating the reasons for dismissing the suit under
Reynolds, the court noted that it decided not to resolve the case
under the Totten bar. 78 The majority was not convinced that the
very subject matter of the suit was a state secret.'79 This was not to
say, however, that the Mohamed case was not barred under
Totten. 80 Rather, the court simply decided not to attempt to
resolve the case under the Totten bar.x1s The majority relied
instead solely on the Reynolds state secrets privilege.
For its Reynolds analysis, the majority noted first that the
government followed the correct procedures for invoking the
state secrets privilege. 8 2 Next, the court explained that the
materials that the government sought to remove were in fact
privileged, because their disclosure would threaten national
security.'18 This was not to say that extraordinary rendition itself
was a state secret, as the existence of the program was public
176. See id. at 1083 (noting that Reynolds state secrets privilege can result in the
termination of a suit in three instances).
177. See id. at 1087 ("[T]here is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged
liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets." (emphasis
omitted)).
178. See id. at 1085 ("We rely on the Reynolds privilege rather than the Totten
bar. . . .").
179. See id. at 1084 ("We do not find it quite so clear that the very subject matter of
this case is a state secret.").
180. See id. ("Here, some of plaintiffs' claims might well fall within the Totten
bar.").
181. See id. at 1085 ("We do not resolve the difficult question of precisely which
claims may be barred under Totten.. . .").
182. See id. ("There is no dispute that the government has complied with Reynolds'
procedural requirements for invoking the state secrets privilege by filing General
Hayden's formal claim of privilege in his public declaration.").
183. Id. at 1086 ("The government's classified disclosures to the court are
persuasive that compelled or inadvertent disclosure of such information in the course of
litigation would seriously harm legitimate national security interests.").
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knowledge. 184 Rather, disclosure of certain aspects of the
program that were not yet public could in fact harm national
security.185 For example, Jeppesen would have to address its role
in certain aspects of the program that had, until the Mohamed
case, remained a secret. 186 The company could not explain its
role in the extraordinary rendition program without articulating
how the United States performs operations that are intended to
remain a secret. 187 Therefore, the case had to be dismissed to
avoid the risk of revealing state secrets, even if only nonprivileged
evidence was used in the litigation.188
In concluding the opinion, the court acknowledged the
grave effect this decision would have on victims of human rights
violations.189 Therefore, the majority proposed four alternative
methods by which the plaintiffs could receive redress for their
injuries. First, the government, knowing all the facts concerning
the experiences of each of the plaintiffs, could evaluate their
claims and privately award reparations in the event of a human
rights violation.190 Second, Congress could conduct its own
investigation of the government's role in the plaintiffs'
renditions.' 9 ' Third, Congress could enact a private bill to
184. See id. at 1090 ("[W]e do not hold the existence of the extraordinary
rendition program is itself a state secret. The program has been publicly
acknowledged . . . .").
185. See id. ("Nonetheless, partial disclosure of the existence and even some
aspects of the extraordinary rendition program does not preclude other details from
remaining state secrets if their disclosure would risk grave harm to national security."
(emphasis omitted)).
186. See id. at 1088 (noting that Jeppesen would be required to reveal secret
information when explaining the nature of the support it gave to the program).
187. See id. at 1089 ("[Tlhere is precious little Jeppesen could say about its relevant
conduct and knowledge without revealing information about how the United States
government does or does not conduct covert operations.").
188. See id. at 1087 ("[W]e hold that dismissal is nonetheless required under
Reynolds because there is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability without
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets." (emphasis omitted)).
189. Id. at 1092 (recognizing that because of decision's "impact on human rights"
the majority did not "reach our decision lightly").
190. Id. at 1091 ("The government, having access to the secret information, can
determine whether . . . misjudgments or mistakes were made that violated plaintiffs'
human rights. Should that be the case, the government may be able to find ways to
remedy such alleged harms while still maintaining the secrecy national security
demands.").
191. Id. ("Second, Congress has the authority to investigate alleged wrongdoing
and restrain excesses by the executive branch.").
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provide plaintiffs a remedy.'92 Fourth, Congress could enact
legislation specifying a cause of action and proper procedures to
litigate claims such as those of the plaintiffs.'93
D. The Dissent
The five dissenters objected to what they believed was the
majority's expansion of the Reynolds state secrets privilege.194
They argued for a more cautious application of the state secrets
privilege due to its ability to perhaps conceal government
misconduct or violate due process.'95 Under their application of
the law, a case could only be dismissed on the grounds of the
Reynolds state secrets privilege if the pieces of evidence that had
been deemed privileged were necessary for the plaintiff to
establish a claim or for a defendant to mount an appropriate
defense.196 As such, the dissent believed the case should have
been remanded to the district court, with the government
required to assert the state secrets privilege with regard to
specific pieces of evidence and for that court to determine
whether such evidence was privileged and to subsequently make
a dismissal determination.1 97
The dissent explained that the proper procedures for this
case would have required the defendant to first file an answer to
192. Id. at 1092 ("When national security interests deny alleged victims of wrongful
governmental action meaningful access to a judicial forum, private bills may be an
appropriate alternative remedy.").
193. Id. ("Fourth, Congress has the authority to enact remedial legislation
authorizing appropriate causes of action and procedures to address claims like those
presented here.").
194. See id. at 1097 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("Reynolds cannot, as the majority
contends, be asserted during the pleading stage to excise entire allegations.").
195. See id. at 1094 (" [T]he doctrine is so dangerous as a means of hiding
government misbehavior under the guise of national security, and so violative of
common rights to due process, that courts should confine its application to the
narrowest of circumstances that still protect the government's essential secrets.").
196. Id. at 1093 ("Within the Reynolds framework, dismissal is justified if and only if
specific privileged evidence is itself indispensable to establishing either the truth of the
plaintiffs' allegations or a valid defense that would otherwise be available to the
defendant.").
197. See id. at 1101 ("We should remand for the government to assert the privilege
with respect to secret evidence, and for the district court to determine what evidence is
privileged and whether any such evidence is indispensable either to Plaintiffs' prima
facie case or to a valid defense otherwise available to Jeppesen. Only if privileged
evidence is indispensable to either party should it dismiss the complaint.").
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the complaint.19 8 Upon completion of that filing, the government
could then assert its claims of privilege with regard to specific
evidence during the discovery stage.199 After these claims for
evidence were evaluated, the court could then determine
whether it was appropriate to dismiss the case. 200 The majority's
decision to dismiss the suit on the pleadings due to a risk of
divulging state secrets is inappropriate because at such an early
stage in the litigation it is unclear as to even what evidence,
privileged or nonprivileged, the plaintiff will use.20' A dismissal at
this stage wrongfully prevents the plaintiffs from even attempting
to prove their case with nonprivileged information. 202
Finally, the dissent is disturbed by the majority's reliance on
El-Masri to support their decision. 203 The dissenters explain that
in El-Masri, the Fourth Circuit conflated the Totten bar with the
Reynolds state secrets privilege in deciding to dismiss that suit.2 04
Moreover, in another case, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc.,
v. Bush, the Ninth Circuit "expressly rejected" the "logic" of El-
Masri.2 0 5 Thus, El-Masri was an odd choice of support for the
majority's holding.
198. Id. at 1098 ("ITIhe obligation is to answer those allegations that can be
answered and to make a specific claim of the privilege as to the rest, so the suit can move
forward.").
199. See id. at 1094 (explaining that the proper approach would be to "require the
government to make its claims of state secrets with regard to specific items of evidence
or groups of such items as their use is sought in the lawsuit").
200. See id. at 1095 ("And when responsive pleading is complete and discovery
under way, judgments as to whether secret material is essential to Plaintiffs' case or
Jeppesen's defense can be made more accurately.").
201. See id. at 1100 (arguing that court cannot determine whether privileged
evidence would be essential to proving a claim without knowing what nonprivileged
evidence a party intends to introduce).
202. See id. at 1094 (expressing dismay that plaintiffs "are not even allowed to
attempt to prove their case by the use of nonsecret evidence in their own hands or in the
hands of third parties").
203. See id. at 1099 n.14 (noting that the Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of El-
Masn).
204. See id. (stating that the Fourth Circuit "merged" the dismissal criteria of Totten
with the dismissal criteria of Reynolds).
205. Id. ("[T]his court in Al-Haramain expressly rejected El-Masr's logic." (citing
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,1201 (9th Cir. 2007))).
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III. ONE STEP TOO FAR: MOHAMED'S EXPANSION OF
REYNOLDS PRIVILEGE
Having summarized the circumstances surrounding the
Mohamed litigation, as well as described the majority and
dissenting opinions in Part II, this Part analyzes the holding of
the Mohamed decision. Specifically, this Comment concludes that
the Mohamed decision represents an unwarranted expansion of
the Reynolds state secrets privilege that renders the privilege
essentially indistinguishable from the Totten bar. Section A
addresses this expansion of the Reynolds state secrets privilege.
Section B contends that the majority's alternative remedies
suggestions are inadequate.
A. State Secrets Privilege after Mohamed
As the dissent correctly noted, the majority reached the
wrong conclusion in Mohamed. Although the majority chose not
to decide the case under Totten, the court expanded the Reynolds
state secrets privilege to become the functional equivalent of
Totten. A case can now be dismissed if there is a risk that state
secrets may be divulged. 206 In the situation where Totten would
not clearly bar a lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit inappropriately
created a second opportunity for a court to dismiss a case.
The ruling in Mohamed is inappropriate because it is
contrary to the intention of the US Supreme Court in Reynolds.
In that case, the Court intended for lawsuits in which the state
secrets privilege was invoked to continue the litigation process,
just without the sensitive evidence. 207 Barring a lawsuit altogether
is a harsh decision that should not be taken lightly. As such, the
Court only allowed the dismissal of a lawsuit to occur in specific
situations, such as when the lawsuit centered on a confidential
agreement.208 Absent such an agreement, the Court wanted the
206. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining that Mohammed was
dismissed because there was "no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability
without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets").
207. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court in
Reynolds allowed plaintiffs to attempt to prove their case using only nonpriviliged
evidence).
208. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of
Totten, which called for dismissal of a lawsuit that involved the enforcement of a secret
espionage contract).
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plaintiffs to at least have the opportunity to attempt to prove
their claim with nonprivileged information. 209 If they could not
make out a prima facie case, the lawsuit would have to be
dismissed. 210 But at least the plaintiffs would have the opportunity
to try to prove their claim.
The Ninth Circuit has, contrary to the Court's intentions,
lowered the threshold to bar a suit. The Mohamed decision
effectively renders the state secrets privilege useless, as it prevents
a plaintiff from even attempting to prove his claim with
nonprivileged evidence. Consequently, the Reynolds state secrets
privilege will no longer function as an evidentiary privilege.
Rather, if a lawsuit might possibly implicate state secrets, the case
can now be dismissed before a single piece of evidence is even
requested. The Mohamed court should have required Jeppesen to
file an answer and then determine whether the materials
containing state secrets should be removed.211 As the dissent
pointed out, it is very difficult for courts to conclude at such an
early stage of a litigation whether a case such as Mohamed will or
will not implicate state secrets. 2 12 After all, anything is possible at
such an early stage.
Furthermore, it was inappropriate for the court to cite to El-
Masri to support its holding.213 El-Masri is a prime example of a
court conflating the Totten bar with the Reynolds state secrets
privilege.214 The Mohamed case, however, is not such a case. The
majority in Mohamed put Totten to the side and decided the case
solely on the grounds of the Reynolds state secrets privilege.215
The majority expanded the states secrets privilege without
209. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (noting that plaintiffs in Reynolds
had an opportunity to prove their case with nonprivileged evidence).
210. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (describing situations when a
lawsuit may be dismissed under Reynolds).
211. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (asserting that proper procedures
would have included requiring the defendant to first file an answer).
212. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining that it was too early to
determine whether there is a risk that state secrets will be divulged because it is unclear
what evidence will even be used).
213. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text (expressing consternation that
majority cited to El-Masri because Ninth Circuit previously rejected the logic of that
decision).
214. See supra notes 103-07 and 204-06 (outlining the Fourth Circuit's justification
for the El-Masri decision).
215. See supra note 179 (noting that the majority will not resolve the suit under the
Totten bar).
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invoking Totten at all. As such, the Mohamed decision is different
from El-Masri. In fact, this decision stands alone, lacking any valid
counterparts.
Additionally, as some commentators have noted, the
Mohamed holding is incredibly troubling because it forecloses
victims of the extraordinary rendition program from turning to
the judicial system to remedy their injuries.216 It is almost
impossible for a plaintiff asserting a claim of torture against
either the US government or its contractors to overcome the
standard established in Mohamed. At the pleading stage of such a
case, it would almost always appear that state secrets would be
implicated. Taking this opportunity away from plaintiffs who
have suffered such horrific crimes is not only unfair, but also
contrary to the very purpose and intention of the state secrets
privilege.
B. Alternative Remedies
Finally, it is worth addressing the alternative remedies
suggested by the Mohamed majority at the end of its opinion.217
Although the majority's compassion for the unfortunate situation
into which its decision placed the plaintiffs is appreciated, it is
also useless.218 Not one of the alternative remedies suggested by
the court would provide the plaintiffs with proper redress. The
suggested alternative remedies requires the US government,
either the executive or the legislative branch, to try to right the
wrong done.219 In this case, however, the plaintiffs were not
seeking redress from the US government. Rather, they sued
Jeppesen, a private corporation.220 As such, an appropriate
alternative remedy must require that Jeppesen, not the US
government, pay damages to the plaintiffs. Turning to the
216. See supra note 5 (explaining that the decision is all the more troubling due to
the seriousness of torture).
217. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (listing the alternative remedies
suggested by majority).
218. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting that the majority
understood the effect of its holding on torture victims).
219. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing the four remedies
plaintiffs could seek from the government).
220. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (explaining that plaintiffs sued
Jeppesen for its role in plaintiffs' renditions).
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government would absolve these complicit corporate actors from
ever having to compensate those they harmed.
CONCLUSION
The unfortunate effects of the Mohamed decision will
continue to be felt by other plaintiffs in the years to come. The
holding almost ensures that neither the US government, nor its
private sector partners, will ever have to answer to claims of
human rights violations. The expansive decision assures that the
Reynolds state secrets privilege will no longer function as purely
an evidentiary privilege. Instead, the Reynolds state secrets
privilege will serve alongside the Totten bar as a rule of
nonjusticiability, rendering victims of torture remediless in the
US judicial system.
